The ancient notion of virtue has gotten a lot of attention among ethicists in recent decades. Meanwhile, a number of ethicists have developed moral theories in which care plays a central role. Can these different strands of moral philosophy—”virtue ethics” and “care ethics”—be reconciled? In today’s session, Jenna Mazzella argues that they can. Jonathan Lang comments.
From 1915-1923, hundreds of thousands of Armenians were killed in a genocide committed by the Ottoman government. Today there is a debate about whether and to what extent Turkey (the Ottoman successor state) is responsible for these killings. In today’s session, Zachary Taylor, drawing from David Miller’s work on collective responsibility, argues against Turkey’s responsibility for the Armenian genocide. David Killoren comments.
An individual’s personality is influenced by “nurture” (the individual’s environment) as well as “nature” (the individual’s genes). But which of these factors is more important? In today’s session, Alec Thompson argues that nurture is the more influential factor. David Killoren comments.
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have argued that if capital punishment has a significant deterrent effect, then capital punishment for murder may be justifiable and even required. Some opponents of capital punishment appeal to a distinction between acts and omissions. These opponents argue that it is worse for the government to kill (through capital punishment) than for the government to allow killings to occur (by not exploiting the deterrent effect of capital punishment). However, Sunstein and Vermeule contend that this objection fails, even if the act/omission distinction is morally relevant at the individual level, because the government is a “special kind of agent.” In today’s session, Breanna Williams offers a critique of Sunstein and Vermeule. Jonathan Trerise comments.
Some opponents of the death penalty have argued that the Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishment, should lead us to favor life in prison, rather than the death penalty, as the punishment for especially serious crimes. In today’s session, Ben Rossi contends that the Eighth Amendment is indeed compatible with a punishment of life in prison. Nevertheless, Ben argues by appeal to a moral education theory of punishment that life in prison ought to be abolished.
J.L. Mackie famously argues that objective moral values would be strange—”utterly different from anything else in the universe”—and imperceptible by ordinary means. Therefore, anyone who claims to know about objective moral values must also claim to possess a special faculty for detecting such values. Yet it is not plausible to suppose that such a faculty exists; thus, we should be skeptical about the existence of objective moral values.
In today’s session, Chad Marxen responds to Mackie. Chad maintains that Mackie’s argument requires a certain kind of empiricism—and that this empiricism has hard-to-accept implications with regard to our knowledge of facts about metaphysics, mathematics and logic. Matt Destefano comments.
According to hard incompatibilism, no human actions are truly free. Hard incompatibilists typically deny that we are ever morally responsible for our actions. Punishment presents a problem for hard incompatibilism. (If we are never morally responsible for our actions, then how can we ever be justly punished for them?) Some hard incompatibilists have suggested that criminal justice be oriented toward quarantine: criminals ought to be removed from society, not because criminals are responsible for their crimes, but simply in order to prevent criminals from doing further harm. In today’s session, Bradley Beall attempts to defend a version of the quarantine model of criminal justice. Emily Crookston comments.
Most people identify as black or white, woman or man, gay or straight etc. How is it that individuals decide which categories to use in describing themselves? In today’s session, Aaron Segal argues that Ian Hacking’s “dynamic nominalism” suggests a deterministic answer to this difficult question. Further, Aaron maintains that this answer may not be as incompatible with Foucault’s ethics as many philosophers think. Matthew Clark comments.
When you buy a bottle of ketchup in a store, you send a message about your willingness to buy that brand of ketchup in that particular store. Thus, spending money seems often to be a form of speech—like burning a flag or writing a newspaper article. But what’s the difference, if any, between speech in the marketplace and other types of speech? For example, do our choices about where to spend our money deserve the same First Amendment protections as political speech?
In today’s session, Kevin Thurston tackles these issues. Marcus Arvan comments.
In a famous paper, Peter Railton argues for “stark, raving moral realism.” As a realist, Railton believes that moral properties are objective (i.e., independent of our states of mind). Further, Railton argues for a naturalist kind of realism, according to which moral properties supervene on and may be reducible to natural properties. Railton says that “moral inquiry is of a piece of empirical inquiry.” In today’s session, Reyes Espinoza, in conversation with Richard Brown, summarizes Railton’s view and a criticism of Railton suggested by Neil Sinclair, and then attempts to answer that criticism on Railton’s behalf.